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Abstract 
We explore the influence of political connections on the firm performance. An analysis of data from 
395 Korean listed firms in manufacturing sector during 2011-2015 reveals that firms with high levels 
of political connections and such presence are negatively related to Tobin Q, operating cash flow, and 
ROA, supporting the rubber stamp perspective. An important implication is that Korean firms 
appointing former officials as outside directors are prone to negatively affect performance. In other 
words, instead of hiring former government officials to take advantages from the government, firms in 
Korea should consider and appoint experts rather than political connections outside-directors in order 
to increase their performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Menon and Williams (1994) argued that the adoption of an outside director system is not important. 
The most important aspect is the operation of independence, activities and expertise of outside 
directors. In 2000, outside directors were introduced in Korea, but concerns about outside directors 
are increasing steadily as the expertise of outside directors, appointment procedures, and uncertainties 
of outside directors are increasing. According to a survey by the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) 
on the status of “Outside directors' management of publicly traded corporations” on March 29, 2007, 
the attendance rate at the board meeting was 70.5% at the end of March and Top 100 companies with 
market cap amount to 86.7% are just maintaining the framework of the system. However, when we 
look at the actual situation of operation, the story is different. This is because many companies are 
still running out of sight. Only about 40 companies (2.9% of the 1403 companies) submitted their 
dissenting opinions or amendments on the board's agenda last year. Furthermore, as a result of 
researching the composition of outside directors, the top five group companies newly elected and 
reappointed 38.46% (number is 91 of 237) of the outside directors from the bureaucracy (Munhwa-
ilbo, November 29, 2007).  
Are political connections always beneficial for firm performance? This research question is my 
main focus. This study explores the firm performance implications of political connections in the 
Korean context because such connections are important factors affecting the performance of Korean 
firms. Even if several researches have empirically explored the influence of political connections on 
corporate performance, whether political connections have a positive or negative influence on 
corporate performance remains an open question. Previous empirical evidence is inconclusive and 
contradictory (Su and Fung, 2013). Some researchers have highlighted the need for addressing how 
political connections may contribute to firm performance in other context (e.g., Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnell, 2006; Fan, Won, and Zhang, 2007; Chizema, Liu, Lu, and Gao, 2015; Zheng, Singh, and 
Mitchell, 2015).  
To answer an aforementioned question, this study conducted an analysis of 395 Korean listed 
manufacturing firms for 2011-2015. South Korean offers an interesting context as Korean firms tend 
to significantly emphasize political connections to take benefits from the government and to have 
higher performance. The findings from the analysis suggest the following: former government 
officials on the outside-directors and the political directors’ presence are negatively related to Tobin’s 
Q and operating cash flow (OCF), suggesting that high ratios of political directors and such presence 
are more likely to be harmful for firm value and OCF. On the other hand, high ratio of politicians on 
the outside-directors are insignificantly related to accounting performance (ROA), whereas the 
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presence of the political directors are more likely to negatively influence accounting performance. 
These findings highlight that the important role of political connections for firm performance. 
I make some contributions to the empirical literature. First, such findings contribute to the 
understanding regarding of the political connections-performance relationship in South Korea. I offer 
the clear evidence that the high level of political connections and the political directors’ presence may 
hurt firm performance. Despite the common belief and theoretical assumption that political 
connections are crucial for achieving high performance, Fan et al. (2007), Su and Fung (2013), 
Chizema et al. (2015), and Zheng et al. (2015) provide few insights into this link as they have chiefly 
concentrated on the Chinese firm performance. On the contrary to Su and Fung (2013)’s research, my 
findings suggest that political connections negatively influence firm performance, filling the gaps 
between empirical evidence and theoretical argument by exploring performance implications of 
political connections in Korea. Second, we use the longitudinal data set to reduce the omitted variable 
concern that plagues the political connection’ studies. I also provide a more united model of political 
connections on corporate performance by considering several performance variables: for instance, 
Tobin’s Q which reflects market value, Operating Cash Flow as cash generating-ability from 
operating activities, and Return on Asset which reflects accounting based performance. 
This study is similar to the Su and Fung (2013) and Lim, Huh, Bae, and Jeong (2015)’s thesis. 
However, there are differences in the following points. First, Su and Fung (2013) used Cash holding, 
Tobin’s Q, and ROA as a substitute variable of performance. Lim et al. (2015) consider only Q of 
Tobin as a substitute variable of performance. However, this study uses Tobin Q, ROA as well as 
operating cash flow that reflects cash flows. Second, this study finds that industries with high political 
relevance are Construction Field (67%), Electronics, Gas, Steam, and Water Supply (60%), and 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical Activities (56%) in order in Korea. But Su and Fung (2013) 
and Lim et al. (2015) have not considered the political connections of industries. Third, in this study, 
the analysis was conducted for companies listed in KOSPI from 2011 to 2015, and Su and Fung (2013) 
analyzed from 2004 to 2008 in China’s firm and Lim et al. (2015) analyzed from 2000 to 2010 in 
Korea’s firm. Lim et al. (2015) showed no significant relation. However, we differ in that it shows a 
significant negative relation using more recent data. 
The remainder of this study consists of the followings. In Section 2, this research describes the 
relevant literature between political connections and corporate performance. In Section 3 explains the 
sampling process, build a model for empirical analysis, and examine the variables introduced. In 
Section 4, I show the results of the empirical analysis and show interpretations and implications. 
Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes and presents this study’s limitations and scope for future 
studies.  
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2. Literature Reviews  
 
In this chapter, we consider the relation between political connections and corporate performance. 
The results of previous studies showed mixed findings of impacts of political connections. There are 
two conflicting perspectives on the role of political directors (Kang and Zhang, 2015). One is the 
monitoring/advising view. This view is that political directors play a significant role in increasing 
corporate value through monitoring activities. The other is the rubber stamp view. This is not the role 
of political directors to monitor and advise, but rather to take the role of unconditional support for 
CEO decisions. Some studies have reported that political connections have a positive influence on 
corporate performance, while others have found that corporate performance is negatively influenced 
by political connections.  
 
2.1 The Positive Impact of Political Connections on Corporate Performance  
 
There is a positive relation between political connections and corporate performance which can be 
inferred from the view that political directors play a role of monitoring within a firm. Research reports 
the positive effects of political connections on corporate performance focuses on the role of outside 
directors. Studies on the outside directors have been actively examined so far. For example, Fama 
(1980) argued that outside directors monitor and control managers to motivate them to make decisions 
for shareholder interests. Fama and Jensen (1983) noted that outside directors control the management 
and participate in board decisions, eventually increasing shareholders' wealth by reducing agency 
problems. 
Many research reported that political relations have a positive impact on firm performance. In 
particular, it is expected that companies will obtain benefit from the selection of former government 
officials among various professional outside directors. For example, Hillman, Zardkoohi, and 
Bierman (1999) argued that political directors can provide important links and confidential policy 
information. They noted that because the public policy process is complex, costly and difficult, 
government officials can improve company performance by promoting sales to the government 
through unique information on political connections and public policy processes. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001) found that government oversight can reduce government enforcement and influence 
government action on corporate profits due to contacts obtained while working in the public sector. It 
is absolutely useful when regulatory action is particularly important, for instance the Food and Drug 
Administration. Su and Fung (2013) analyzed that firms with political affiliations have a positive 
influence on cash holdings and corporate performance (ROA, Tobin Q) for Chinese firms.  
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In addition, many previous studies have verified that companies can gain the benefits from close 
links with politicians A firm with political relevance has priority in accessing credit and maintaining 
government contracts (e.g., Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009). 
Faccio (2006) noted that politically linked firms receive government bailouts in the financial sector. 
Adhikari, Derashid, and Zhang (2006) and Faccio (2006, 2010) found that companies with political 
affiliations are paying lower taxes and gaining preferential benefits via going public. In addition, 
political directors have even improved their accounting and financial performance directly (e.g., 
Goldman et al., 2009; Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov, 2010). Lastly, Hellman, Jones, and 
Kaufmann (2003) analyzed that politically linked companies could easily secure property rights.  
Therefore, political directors play a significant role in value-enhancing firms’ decision making as 
effective monitors/advisors, in particular when they do business in a regulatory environment or when 
companies preserve a main trading association with the government. As a result, companies with 
political connections are expected to show higher corporate performance due to these benefits.  
 
2.2 The Negative Impact of Political Connections on Corporate Performance   
 
Some studies have found that firms with political connections have a positive impact on firm 
performance. On the other hand, a lot of researches have analyzed the negative relationship. The 
evidence that there is a negative relation between government connections and firm performance can 
be inferred from the view that Political directors are acting as rubber stamp views within the firm. 
A rubber stamp view indicates that the political directors are an ineffective monitoring / advice 
perspective. This is due to the fact that government supervisors tend to have less business experience 
in finance, accounting and corporate governance. The lack of accounting and financial knowledge will 
reach the limits in terms of monitoring and advice. Employees must have a different set of skills when 
they become political directors in government agencies and private companies. Government agencies 
that spend more time with government and lack of business and industry experience can make it 
difficult to understand how government agencies affect investment and financial decisions. 
If the government lacks experience with firms or lacks accounting knowledge of finance and 
governance, the effect of monitor/advisors on the company is likely to decline. Custodio and Metzger 
(2013) analyzed that increasing the shareholders' assets in the acquisition process led to the CEOs of 
the acquired companies. Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2010) examined the relation between 
advisory activities and effective monitoring of the board and firm performance. In addition, Badolato, 
Donelson, and Ege (2014) analyzed that the relation between audit committees with financial 
expertise and earnings management. They found that audit committees with financial expertise made 
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low earnings management.  
The above papers argued that the board of directors can increase the value of the firm by 
accounting and financial experts. Moreover, CEOs may hire elderly government officials because 
their salary can be low, but they have other private benefits like their relation with older government 
officials, which they can obtain a lot of information from their relationship with them. However, 
political directors can be more intimate with CEOs, less likely to face management and actively 
participate in disciplining management (Hwang and Kim, 2009; Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014; 
Clune, Hermanson, Tompkins, and Ye, 2014). CEOs who appointed these political directors may be 
less constrained than those of firms appointing non-political directors.  
There is an empirical analysis in which political connections have a negative influence on 
performance.  
For instance, Kang and Zhang (2015) investigated the role of outside directors with government 
experience (government directors) at the corporate board. They found that government directors were 
prone to miss the board meetings and that the announcement of appointment was greeted negatively. 
They also found that unlike other outside directors, the attending of the CEO's board did not affect the 
performance of CEO sales. In addition, firms with government directors have poor business results 
and announcements of merger have negative consequences. However, these companies are less likely 
to be taxed and mergers brought up by antitrust authorities. Using the instrumental variable approach 
to control for endogenous bias does not change the outcome. They also found that the opposite effects 
of government oversight are greatly mitigated when corporate have high government sales, operate in 
controlled industries, or have politically connected government directors.  
Lim et al. (2015) analyzed that firm value of the companies with ex-bureaucrat outside directors are 
significantly higher in average and median than companies without ex-bureaucrat outside directors. 
However, when the properties of companies and the board of the directors, which have been reported 
to influence firm value, are controlled, no significant differences are observed. To the contrary to their 
expectation, they do not find significant differences in firm value between when firms without ex-
bureaucrat outside directors appoint former bureaucrats as outside directors and when companies with 
ex-bureaucrat outside directors do not re-appoint them as outside directors. Furthermore, the firms 
with higher percentage of ex-bureaucrat outside directors are significantly lower in firm value than the 
firms with lower percentage of ex-bureaucrat outside directors. 
Nonetheless, only few studies excepting Lim et al. (2015) have explored the influence of political 
connections on the performance among firms in Korea. In this way, political connections negatively 
influence on firm performance. As a result, it can be seen that there is no consistent result between 
political connections and corporate performance. Especially, research on this subject is rare in Korea. 
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3. Data and Method 
 
3.1 Data Sampling  
 
In this study, this paper is to analyze the relation between political directors and corporate 
performance (Tobin’s Q, OCF, and ROA) through hand-collected data from 2011 to 2015.  
Firstly, I collect a sample of political connections outside board data from DART (through Registered 
Officer Status). We define political connections of outside-directors as Political directors. This study 
classified Political directors as below:  
 
Political directors’ definition: 
1) If registered outside directors are former government official, they are classified as political   
director. 
2) If registered outside directors experienced various job, but experienced government official at least    
once, they are classified as political directors. 
3) Professors, accountant and journalist are not classified as political directors.  
 
After obtaining political connections data, we have 1,975 observations in KOSPI. Secondly, we 
collect accounting and financial data from TS-2000 dataset (It is similar to COMPUSTAT in USA) 
and matching the political connections data. After that, I delete omitted observations. Finally, we 
obtain 1,580 observations (395 samples) in this paper.  
 
I selected sample companies below criteria.  
 
1) Select only KOSPI listed firms 
2) Excludes companies that are unable to obtain financial and political director data for TS2000 and 
DART from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2015. 
3) Excludes banking, securities, insurance, etc. from the sample companies because they differ from 
general manufacturing in terms of capital structure, operating method, and government regulation 
supervision. 
4) Companies do not have cash and cash equivalent assets or whose assets are less than one billion 
won or whose sales are not included are excluded from the sample because they may cause 
abnormalities in the variables. 
5) To dilute the effect of outlier on the analysis results, 1% of the upper and lower levels of the                                                 
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dependent variables were winsorized. 
 
Furthermore, I give independent variables to time-lagged. This is because it can reduce the effect of 
political linkage on the corporate value of causal relationships. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 summarizes the industrial classification.  
 
3.2 Model and Variable Definitions 
 
3.2.1 Analysis Model of Tobin’s Q (Market performance)  
 
We use below panel least square model that has been widely utilized in researches to examine the 
relation between political directors and market-based performance. We use the following panel model 
to measure market-based performance.  
 
(1) 
 Tobin’s Qit+1= β0+β1×Political Dummy (or Political Ratio) it+β2× FFOit +β3× Board Independenceit  
                                          +β4× Board Sizeit + β5× OCFit +β6× LEVit +β7× PPEit +β8× SIZEit  
+β9× AGEit +εit                                                                                    
   
Where, 
Tobin’s Qit+1 
 
Political Dummy 
 
Political Ratio 
 
FFO 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
OCF 
 
LEV 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
is operationalized as asset book value, less equity book value, plus the 
equity market value, divided by asset book value at time. 
is a dummy that if at least one Political director on the board we 
coded 1, 0 otherwise at time.  
is the number of political director divided by number of board of 
directors at time. 
is operationalized as foreigner ownership at time. 
is operationalized as outside director’s number divided by board 
size(number) at time. 
is operationalized as board number at time. 
is operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets  
at time. 
is operationalized as the ratio liability to assets at time. 
PPE = is operationalized as fixed asset, less land, less construction in 
progress, divided by assets at time.  
SIZE = Ln(employee) at time.  
AGE = Ln(number of years) at time. 
 
Dependent variable. This study considers market based performance operationalization for corporate 
performance. Consistent with most prior literatures on the firm value and market value, performance 
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is operationalized by the Tobin’s Q (Su and Fung, 2013, Lim et al., 2015). It is operationalized as 
asset book value, less equity book value, plus equity market value, divided by asset book value 
Independent variable. To explore the effect of political directors on corporate performance, the 
present study utilizes two variables for examining the political directors. Firstly, political dummy 
variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if at least one political connections of outside-director on the 
board, 0 otherwise (Su et al., 2013). Secondly, we operationalize political connections for political 
ratio which is the number of political connections of outside-director divided by number of board of 
directors (Amon et al., 2015). 
Control variables. We use control variables related to the firm-characteristic factors that would affect 
firm performance. First, we use three variables as proxies for the ownership, namely foreigner 
ownership, Board independence, and board size. Foreign ownership is operationalized by ownership 
owned by foreign investor, board independence is operationalized outside director’s number divided 
by board size (number), and board size, operationalized by the number of board (Kang and Zhang 
2015). Second, we also some variables as proxies for the firm characteristics which are operating cash 
flow, leverage, PPE, firm size, and firm age. Operating cash flow is operationalized as operating cash 
flow divided by asset book value (Lim et al., 2015). Leverage is operationalized by liability divided 
by assets (Su and Fung, 2013). PPE means that assets, operationalized by fixed asset, less land, less 
construction in progress, divided by assets. Firm size is operationalized by Ln (employees) and firm 
age is operationalized by Ln (the number of years). 
 
3.2.2 Analysis Model of Operating Cash Flow (Cash generating-ability) 
 
There are two operationalization of firm performance. 1) Operating Cash Flow, as 
operationalization of cash generating-ability from operating activities. 2) Return on Assets as 
operationalization of accounting performance. One important aspect of a company's performance 
evaluation is its ability to generate cash flow. Therefore, we additionally examine the 
operationalization of cash generating-ability. We develop the following regression to operationalize 
cash generating-ability.  
 
(2)  
OCFit+1= β0+β1×Political Dummy (or Political Ratio) it+β2× FFOit +β3× Board Independenceit  
                                       +β4× Board Sizeit + β5× LEVit +β6× PPEit +β7× SIZEit +β8× AGEit +εit 
 
Where, 
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OCFit+1  
 
Political Dummy 
 
Political Ratio 
 
FFO 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
LEV                     
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
is operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets at 
time 1.  
is a dummy that if at least one Political director on the board 
we coded 1, 0 otherwise at time.  
is the number of Political director divided by number of board 
of directors at time. 
is operationalized as foreigner ownership at time. 
is operationalized as outside director’s number divided by   
board size(number) at time. 
is operationalized as board number at time. 
is operationalized as the ratio liability to asset at time. 
PPE = is operationalized as fixed asset, less land, less construction in 
progress, divided by assets at time. 
SIZE = Ln(employee) at time.  
AGE = Ln(number of years) at time. 
 
Dependent variable. This study considers not only market performance but also cash generating-
ability operationalization for corporate performance. Operating Cash flow is operationalized by 
operating cash flow divided by assets (Lim et al., 2015). 
Independent variable. The present study utilizes two variables to investigate the influence of 
political directors on their cash generating-ability. Firstly, political dummy variable is a dummy that 
equals to 1 if at least one political connections of outside-director on the board, otherwise 0 (Su and 
Fung, 2013). Secondly, we operationalization political connections for political ratio which is political 
directors’ number divided by board of directors (number) (Amon et al., 2015). 
Control variables. Use control variables related to corporate special factors that can affect the 
performance of a company. First, foreigner ownership is operationalized by percentage of foreigner 
ownership (Lim et al., 2015). Second, Board independence is operationalized as outside director’s 
number divided by board size (number). Third, board size, operationalized by the number of board 
(Kang and Zhang 2015). Forth, we control leverage, operationalized by liability divided by assets (Su 
et al., 2013). Fifth, PPE is operationalized by the assets, operationalized by fixed asset, less land, less 
construction in progress, divided by assets. Lastly, given that the results of previous study that size 
[Ln (employees)], age [Ln (the number of years)] are related to firm performance. 
 
3.2.3 Analysis Model of ROA (Accounting Performance)  
 
ROA is perhaps the most common operationalization of corporate performance in accounting and 
finance literatures. Therefore, we check the relation between Political directors and book based 
performance as ROA. We make following equations to examine between Political directors and 
accounting performance. 
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(3)  
ROAit+1= β0+β1×Political Dummy (or Political Ratio) it+β2× FFOit +β3× Board Independenceit  
                                      +β4× Board Sizeit + β5× LEVit +β6× PPEit +β7× SIZEit +β8× AGEit +εit 
 
Where, 
ROAit+1  
Political Dummy 
 
Political Ratio 
 
FFO 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
LEV 
= 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
= 
 
= 
= 
is operationalized as bottom-line divided by assets at time 1.  
is a dummy that if at least one Political director on the board 
we coded 1, 0 otherwise at time.  
is the number of political director divided by number of board 
of directors at time. 
is operationalized as foreigner ownership at time.  
is operationalized as outside director’s number divided by 
board size(number) at time. 
is operationalized as the number of board at time. 
is operationalized as  liability divided by  assets at time. 
PPE = is operationalized as fixed asset, less land, less construction in 
progress, divided by assets at time.  
SIZE = Ln(employee) at time.  
AGE = Ln(number of years) at time.  
 
  
Dependent variable. This chapter, we also consider accounting performance based on accrual basis 
as operationalized ROA. Return on Asset (ROA) is operationalized as bottom-line divided by assets. 
Independent variable. To analyze the impact of political directors on accounting performance, the 
present study utilizes two variables for examining the political directors Firstly, political dummy 
variable is a dummy that equals to 1 if at least one political director on the board (Su and Fung, 2013). 
Secondly, we operationalize political connections for political ratio which is number of political 
director divided by number of board of directors (Amon et al., 2015). 
Control variables. We use control variables related to the firm-characteristic factors that would affect 
firm performance. First, foreigner ownership is operationalized by percentage of foreigner ownership 
(Lim et al, 2015). Second, board independence is operationalized as outside director’s number divided 
by board size (number). Third, board size, operationalized by the number of board (Kang and Zhang 
2015). Forth, we control leverage, operationalized by liability divided by assets (Su et al., 2013). Fifth, 
PPE is operationalized by fixed asset, less land, less construction in progress, divided by assets. Lastly, 
given that the results of previous study that size [Ln (employees)], age [Ln (number of years)] are 
related to firm performance. 
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4. Empirical Results  
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics  
 
Tables 1 show a summary of the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The 
average Q is 1.099 suggesting firms did create values for the shareholders’ and the firm has positive 
NPV which having good expectations for future performance. The average OCF is 4.5% means that 
sample firms have on average 4.5% to assets. The average ROA is 1.2% also means that sample firms 
have on average book based performance. The mean of political dummy shows that about 42%. This 
means that KOSPI firms have at least one political connection of outside-directors. Furthermore, the 
mean of political ratio means that firms have around 10% former government officials on the boards. 
The average of FFO is 10.4%, which means the foreign ownership. The average of board 
independence and board size are 0.321. This is considered to be indicating outside director number 
among board size (number). The average of board size is 6.675 suggesting the number of board. The 
average of leverage and PPE is 43.9%, 16.4%, respectively. 
  
4.2 Political Connections by Industry Distribution  
 
Table 2 provides the industry distribution based on KRX big class level of the standard industrial 
classification. Manufacturing is the largest sector (5,580 observations, 71.6%). This study find that 
industries with higher level of political connections are construction field (67%), Electronics, Gas, 
Steam, Water Supply (60%), and Professional, Scientific and technical activities (56%) in order. It 
assumes that these industries are heavily related to government policy. This also suggests that firms in 
the industries with strict regulatory environment have more politicians than firms in less regulated 
industries. Therefore, we suppose that firms with highly political connections have strong incentive to 
seek former government officials.  
 
4.3 Correlation Test 
 
Table 3 shows that the Pearson correlation matrix. This study examines the correlation between Q, 
OCF, and ROA as dependent variables. Q, OCF, and OCF are positively correlated with ROA. 
However, the result is no significant correlation between Q and ROA. The correlation between 
political dummy and political ratio is some high (0.844). Although the correlation coefficient between 
the two variables is high, it seems that there is no problem because it is used alternately. Apart from 
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this result, the rest of correlation coefficient ranges between 0.487 (between board independence and 
political ratio) and -0.064 (between political ratio and age). And it shows that there is a significant or 
non-significant correlation among variables. But the coefficients is not exceed at 0.500 despite there is 
significant correlation among variables and the number of sample (395) does go far enough. To 
capture a multicollinearity problem among independent variable, we operationalize a VIF. It shows 
that our data is within the statistics’ tolerance (3.914). This study concludes that there are no 
multicollinearity issues in the data. 
 
4.4 The Effect of Political Connections on Tobin’s Q  
 
In this chapter, we examine the effect of political directors on market value. As shown above, 
equation (1) is a panel model that the dependent variable is Tobin’s Q as operationalization of market 
value and the independent variable is political directors (political dummy and political ratio) with 
control variables. Table 4 presents that the result of the effect of political directors on firm value (Q). 
Model (1) is the effect of political dummy on the Tobin’s Q with panel analysis. Model (2) examines 
the relation between political ratio and Tobin’s Q. Model (3) and Model (4) are included industry 
fixed effect, year effect and clustered by firm. Peterson (2009) found that the correct way to estimate 
the standard error. When residuals are correlated through observations, OLS standard errors can be 
biased and underestimated or underestimated the actual variability of the coefficient estimates. 
Following his paper, we put standard errors clustered by firm in Column 3 and 4. 
 
The results are as follows:  
Firstly, In Model (1) and Model (3), political dummy is negatively and statistically significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q at 1% and 5% level respectively (Model (1) coefficient: -0.131 and Model (3) 
coefficient: -0.133). Model (1) results suggesting that the coefficient estimate on the dummy variable 
for firms with political dummy is significant -0.131, implies that firm value for firms with political 
connections are approximately 13% lower than for firms without political connection. This result can 
be regarded as supporting the rubber stamp views in Korea. Rubber stamp views are not the role of 
political directors to monitor and advise, but rather take on the role of unconditional support for CEO 
decisions. However, my result is partially different from that of Lim et al. (2015). Lim et al. (2015) 
did not find significant differences in corporate value between when companies without ex-bureaucrat 
outside directors appoint former government officials as outside directors and when companies with 
political directors do not re-appoint them as outside directors. Furthermore, the companies with higher 
percentage of political directors are significantly lower in corporate value than the companies with 
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lower percentage of political directors. This result is also inconsistent with Su and Fung (2013). They 
found that the firms with political connections are positively impact on firm value (Q). Maybe it 
causes difference in structural characteristics of board of directors between Korea and China.   
 
Secondly, In Model (2) and Model (4), political ratio is negatively and statistically significant 
impact on Tobin’s Q at 1% and 1% level respectively (Model (2) coefficient: -0.589 and Model (3) 
coefficient: -0.569). The result of Model (2), we also find that firms with high level of political 
connections are negatively affecting firm value. Furthermore, we develop Model (3) and (4) as panel 
analysis with industry fixed effect; year fixed effect and clustered by firm level. Our results still 
remain significantly negative after adjusting for firm effect. In terms of economic significance, we 
find that firm value for firms with political dummy is approximately 13% lower than for firms without 
political connection. In addition, we also find that firms with high level of political connections are 
negatively affecting firm value.  
 
Overall, these illustrations imply that political directors negatively impact on firms’ market value. 
This result supports the opinion that political connections negatively influence the firm market based 
performance. 
 
Thirdly, in control variables, foreign ownership, board independence, leverage, and operating cash 
flow are positively impact on Tobin’s Q. In contrast, PPE and firm age are statistically negative 
impact on Tobin’s Q. Lim et al. (2015) and Su and Fung (2013) also reported a negative relation 
between firm size and Tobin's Q. However, Su and Fung (2013) reported a positive relation between 
leverage, size and Tobin's Q. On the other hand, Lim et al. (2015) reported a negative relation between 
leverage, size and Tobin's Q.  
 
4.5 The Effect of Political Connections on Operating Cash Flow  
 
One more important aspect of a company's performance evaluation is its ability to generate cash 
flow. Thus, we examine the association between political directors and cash generating-ability from 
operating activities in this section. However, operating cash flow is the operationalization of the 
amount of cash generated by a company’s normal business operations without accrual basis income. 
Therefore, this paper extends to examine the operating cash flow for firm performance. Equation (2) 
is a regression model that the dependent variable is operating cash flow, operationalized as operating 
cash flow divided by assets (Lim et al., 2015). The independent variable is political directors (political 
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dummy and political ratio) with control variables. 
  
Table 5 presents that the result of the effect of political directors on operating cash flow. Model (5) 
is the effect of Political Dummy on the OCF with OLS. Model (6) examines the relation between 
Political Ratio and OCF. Model (7) and Model (8) are included industry fixed effect, year effect and 
clustered by firm. Peterson (2009) found that the correct way to estimate the standard error. When 
residuals are correlated through observations, standard errors can be biased and underestimated or 
underestimated the actual variability of the coefficient estimates. Following his paper, we put standard 
errors clustered by firm in Column (3) and (4). 
 
The results are as follows:  
Firstly, In Model (1) and Model (3), political dummy is negatively and statistically significant 
impact on OCF at 5% and 10% level respectively (Model (1) coefficients: -0.008 and Model (3) 
coefficient: -0.007). Model (1) shows that the coefficient estimate on the dummy variable for firms 
with political dummy is significant -0.008, implies that firm value for firms with political connections 
are approximately 0.08% lower than for firms without political connection. This result is inconsistent 
with Su et al. (2013). They found that the firms with political connections are positively impact on 
cash holding. Maybe it also causes difference in structural characteristics of board of directors 
between Korea and China.   
 
Secondly, In Model (2) and Model (4), political ratio is negatively and statistically significant 
impact on OCF at 5% and 10% level respectively (Model (2) coefficient: -0.03 and Model (4) 
coefficient: -0.03). The result of Model (2), we also find that firms with high level of political 
connections are negatively affecting OCF. Furthermore, we develop Model (3) and (4) as panel with 
industry fixed effect; year fixed effect and clustered by firm level. Our results still remain 
significantly negative after adjusting for firm effect. In terms of economic significance, we find that 
firm value for firms with political dummy is approximately 0.7% lower than for firms without 
political connection. In addition, we also find that firms with high level of political connections are 
negatively affecting OCF.  
 
In other words, these illustrations suggest that political directors negatively impact on Cash 
generating-activity (OCF). This result supports the opinion that political connections have a negative 
effect on the ability of generating cash flow. 
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Thirdly, in control variables, PPE, foreign ownership, and firm size are positively impact on OCF. 
In contrast, leverage and firm age are statistically negative impact on OCF. The positive relation 
between firm size and OCF is the same as that of Su and Fung (2013), which analyze the relation 
between firm size and cash holding. However, since there is a significant negative relation between 
leverage and OCF, my result is the same as those of Su and Fung (2013) using cash holding. However, 
since there is a significant positive relation between PPE and OCF, this result is the different as those 
of Su and Fung (2013).  
 
4.6 The Effect of Political Connections on ROA   
 
Although we examine relation between political directors and cash generating-ability, we further 
test the association between political connections and accounting performance. The operationalization 
of accounting performance is ROA which is probably the most common operationalization of firm 
performance or firm values in accounting and finance literatures. Equation (3) is a regression model 
that the dependent variable is ROA as bottom-line divided by assets. The independent variable is 
political directors (political dummy and political ratio) with control variables. 
  
Table 6 presents that the result of the effect of political directors on firm value. Model (1) is that the 
effect of political dummy on the return on assets (ROA) with panel. Model (2) examines the relation 
between political ratio and ROA. Model (3) and Model (4) are included industry fixed effect, year 
effect and clustered by firm. Peterson (2009) found that the correct way to estimate the standard error. 
When residuals are correlated through observations, OLS standard errors can be biased and 
underestimated or underestimated the actual variability of the coefficient estimates. Following his 
paper, we put standard errors clustered by firm in Column (3) and (4). 
 
The results are as follows:  
Firstly, only Model (1) political dummy is negatively and statistically significant impact on ROA at 
5% level (Model (1) coefficient: -0.008). Model (1) presents that the coefficient estimate on the 
dummy variable for firms with political dummy is significant -0.008 implies that accounting based 
performance for firms with political connections are approximately 0.8% lower than for firms without 
political connection. However, Model (3) is statistically non-significant. The reasons for the 
difference between ROA and accounting performance are different basis. Because ROA is based on 
accrual and cash basis, but ROA is only operationalized cash basis performance. Moreover, 
accounting-based measurements are inherently short-lived, tap only past performance, and are more 
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likely to be managerial manipulation (Briloff, 1972; McGuire, Schneeweis, and Hill, 1986; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1990). This result is the different from those of Su and Fung (2013). They showed a 
positive relation between political connections and ROA. 
Secondly, there is no evidence that the relation between political ratio and ROA are not statistically 
significant (Model (2), (3)). 
In summary, these illustrations suggest that political directors negatively impact on accounting 
based performance only model (1). This result is insufficient to support the view that political 
connections have a negative effect on ROA which is effect on the accounting based performance. 
Thirdly, control variables with negative impact on ROA are leverage, board independence and firm 
age. In contrast, foreign ownership and firm size are statistically positive impact on accounting 
performance.    
 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
 
We explore the impacts of political connections on the Korean firm performance, a crucial research 
topic that ignored by the literature. The results lend significant support to my expectation. I find that 
high level of former government officials on the outside-directors and presence are negatively related 
to Tobin’s Q and operating cash flow (OCF) suggesting that high level of political directors and such 
presence may hurt firm value and OCF. On the other hand, high level of political directors is 
insignificantly associated with accounting performance (ROA), whereas the presence of the political 
directors is more likely to negatively influence accounting performance, highlighting the important 
role of political connections for firm performance. 
Such findings provide insights and contributions for literature on the relation between political 
connections and the corporate performance. First of all, I represent one of the few attempts to analyze 
the performance implications of political connections among firms in South Korea. The present study 
contributes to the understanding of the political connection-firm performance link. I further offer the 
clear evidence that highlight the crucial role of political connections for firm performance. In spite of 
the theoretical assumption and common belief that political connections are positively related to   
corporate performance, most previous researches offer limited insights into this link as they have 
chiefly concentrated on the Chinese corporate performance (Chizema et al., 2015; Fan et al., 2007; Su 
and Fung, 2013; Zheng et al., 2015). On the contrary to Su and Fung (2013)’s research, our results 
suggest that firms with high level of political connections are negatively related to firm performance, 
complementing the gaps between empirical evidence and theoretical argument by exploring 
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performance implications of political connections in Korean context. Second, the present study 
utilizes the longitudinal data analysis with the fixed-effect model to reduce the omitted variable 
concerns that plague the political connection’ study. I further offer more united pictures of political 
connections on corporate performance by considering several performance variables for instance 
Tobin’s Q as market value, ROA as accounting performance, and OCF as cash generating-ability 
from operating activities.  
Of course, my study is subject to limitations. First, I do not consider management process and 
styles that may affect the political connections and firm performance and how firms manage the firm 
governance system. The efficient management of risks and political connections may merit further 
research. Second, even if I represent politically connected firms in South Korea are more likely to 
have the poor firm performance, political connections may also have social costs. These costs are 
related to associated-party transactions and excessive investments, encouraging agency cost concerns. 
Such social costs are crucial factors to explore but the present study leaves this important factor for 
future research. Third, the sample is limited to Korea and thus the results cannot be generalized to all 
firms. Our findings represent that corporate governance is more likely to be associated with 
comprehension of the political connection' implications. Future studies should be conducted to cover 
firms in other countries to contrast the findings with those presented in this study. Moreover, 
comparative research that includes both changes in firm-level governance features and national 
governance features will be a fruitful arena for future research. 
I also have important managerial implications. The findings represent that political connections in 
South Korea are negatively related to firm performance, implying that firms with high levels of 
political directors and the presence of political connections may hurt firm performance. Hence, 
appointing former government officials as outside directors may be inappropriate. In other words, 
instead of hiring former government officials to take advantages from the government, firms in South 
Korea should consider and appoint experts rather than political directors. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Q t+1 1,580 1.099 0.620 0.438 4.722 
OCFt+1 1,580 0.045 0.062 -0.137 0.211 
ROA t+1 1,580 0.012 0.137 -1.515 3.364 
Political Dummy t 1,580 0.424 0.494 0.000 1.000 
Political Ratio t 1,580 0.093 0.129 0.000 0.600 
FFO t 1,580 0.104 0.145 0.000 0.897 
Board Independence t 1,580 0.321 0.166 0.000 0.917 
Board Size t 1,580 6.675 2.085 1.000 19.000 
OCF t 1,580 0.042 0.065 -0.277 0.328 
LEV t 1,580 0.439 0.219 0.005 1.577 
PPE t 1,580 0.164 0.125 0.000 0.825 
SIZE t 1,580 2.661 0.626 0.778 4.980 
AGE t 1,580 1.578 0.257 0.000 2.068 
 
Note: Q is operationalized as asset book value, less equity book value, plus equity market value, divided by asset book value 
at time 1,.OCF is operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets at time 1, ROA is operationalized by 
bottom-line divided by assets at time 1, Political Dummy is a dummy that equals to 1 if at least one Political director 
on the board, 0 otherwise at time, Political Ratio is Political director’s number divided by board of directors’ number 
at time, FFO is operationalized as foreigner ownership at time, Board Independence is operationalized as outside 
director number divided by board size(number) at time, Board Size is operationalized as board number at time, OCF is 
operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets at time, LEV is operationalized as the ratio liability to assets at 
time, PPE is operationalized as fixed asset, less land, less construction in progress, divided by assets at time, SIZE is 
Ln(employee) at time, AGE is Ln(number of years). Q, OCF, and ROA are winsorized by 1% level in order to 
smoothing the outlier.  
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Table 2 
Industry Breakdown of Full Sample 
Industry N % Mean SD Min Max 
Agriculture 16 1.0 0.107 0.088 0.000 1.000 
Mining 4 0.3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Manufacturing 1,132 71.6 0.377 0.485 0.000 1.000 
Electronics, Gas, Steam, Water supply 28 1.8 0.607 0.497 0.000 1.000 
Construction 92 5.8 0.674 0.471 0.000 1.000 
Wholesale/Retail trade 104 6.6 0.490 0.502 0.000 1.000 
Transportation 56 3.5 0.357 0.484 0.000 1.000 
Information and Communication 40 2.5 0.550 0.504 0.000 1.000 
Professional, Scientific and technical activities 100 6.3 0.560 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Business facilities management and business support 
services 
4 0.3 0.250 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Art, Sports and Recreation related services 4 0.3 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
 
1,580 100.0     
 
Note: Industry category is based on the KRX big class level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 VIF 
1.Q 
1 
 
                        
2.OCF 
0.13 
** 
1 
            
3.ROA 
0.03 
 
0.20 
** 
1 
           
4.Political 
Dummy 
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
1 
         
3.69 
 
5.Political Ratio 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.84 
** 
1 
        
3.91 
 
6.FFO 
0.23 
** 
0.21 
** 
0.15 
** 
0.24 
** 
0.22 
** 
1 
       
1.50 
 
7.Board 
Independence 
0.10 
** 
0.02 
 
0.04 
 
0.40 
** 
0.49 
** 
0.33 
** 
1 
      
1.49 
 
8.Board Size 
0.09 
** 
0.11 
** 
0.07 
** 
0.28 
** 
0.21 
** 
0.34 
** 
0.27 
** 
1 
     
1.28 
 
9.OCF 
0.14 
** 
0.35 
** 
0.31 
** 
-0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.21 
** 
0.03 
 
0.09 
** 
1 
    
1.16 
 
10.LEV 
0.00 
 
-0.18 
** 
-0.34 
** 
0.07 
** 
0.10 
** 
-0.15 
** 
0.08 
** 
-0.02 
 
-0.23 
** 
1 
   
1.19 
 
11.PPE 
-0.04 
 
0.19 
** 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.08 
** 
0.06 
* 
0.15 
** 
0.16 
** 
0.14 
** 
1 
  
1.13 
 
12.SIZE 
0.12 
** 
0.17 
** 
0.08 
** 
0.35 
** 
0.35 
** 
0.48 
** 
0.40 
** 
0.37 
** 
0.16 
** 
0.16 
** 
0.25 
** 
1 
 
1.71 
 
13.AGE 
-0.08 
** 
-0.07 
** 
-0.04 
 
-0.11 
** 
-0.06 
* 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
* 
-0.10 
** 
-0.01 
 
0.02 
 
-0.05 
 
1 
 
1.04 
 
 
Note: 1. Q is operationalized as asset book value, less equity book value, plus equity market value, divided by asset book 
value at time 1. OCF is operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets at time 1. ROA is operationalized 
by bottom-line divided by assets at time 1. Political Dummy is a dummy that equals to 1 if at least one Political 
director on the board, 0 otherwise at time, Political Ratio is Political director’s number divided by board of directors’ 
number at time, FFO is operationalized as foreigner ownership at time, Board Independence is operationalized as 
outside director’s number divided by board size(number) at time, Board Size is operationalized as board number at 
time, OCF is operationalized as operating cash flow divided by assets at time, LEV is operationalized as the ratio 
liability to assets at time, PPE is operationalized as fixed asset, less land, less construction in progress, divided by 
assets at time, SIZE is Ln(employee) at time, AGE is Ln(number of years).  
     2.*, ** indicate significance at the 5%, and 1% level. 
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Table 4 
The Effect of Political Connections on Tobin’s Q 
     
Q Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Political Dummy -0.131***  -0.133**  
 
Political Ratio 
 
(0.035) 
 
 
 
-0.589*** 
(0.137) 
(0.055) 
 
 
 
-0.569*** 
(0.211) 
FFO 
 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
 
OCF 
 
LEV 
0.914*** 
(0.126) 
0.203* 
(0.105) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
0.999*** 
(0.248) 
0.200*** 
0.901*** 
(0.126) 
0.276** 
(0.110) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
0.991*** 
(0.247) 
0.203*** 
0.839** 
(0.405) 
0.127 
(0.166) 
0.006 
(0.013) 
0.973*** 
(0.447) 
0.362*** 
0.822** 
(0.404) 
0.190 
(0.169) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
0.969** 
(0.450) 
0.355*** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.130) (0.130) 
PPE -0.453*** -0.453*** -0.462** -0.463** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.216) (0.215) 
SIZE 0.015 0.019 0.0514 0.056 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.072) (0.074) 
AGE -0.184*** -0.174*** -0.164* -0.153 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.098) (0.099) 
Constant 1.114*** 1.081*** 1.000*** 0.956*** 
 (0.122) (0.122) (0.247) (0.248) 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 
R-squared 0.085 0.088 0.147 0.148 
 
Note: 1. all variables are defined as before.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
     3. Standard error in parenthesis. 
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Table 5 
The Impact of Political Connections on Operating Cash Flow 
     
OCF Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Political Dummy -0.008**  -0.007*  
 
Political Ratio 
 
(0.003) 
 
 
 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
-0.028* 
(0.016) 
FFO 
 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
 
LEV 
0.052*** 
(0.012) 
-0.017 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.055*** 
0.051*** 
(0.012) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.055*** 
0.049* 
(0.026) 
-0.016 
(0.013) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.056*** 
0.048* 
(0.025) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.056*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
PPE 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.092*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) 
SIZE 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
AGE -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.017* -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Constant 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.021 0.019 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.024) 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 
R-squared 0.125 0.125 0.143 0.143 
 
Note: 1. all variables are defined as before.  
2. ***, ** and * indicate the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
     3. standard error in parenthesis. 
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Table 6 
The Impact of Political Connections on Return on Assets 
     
ROA Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
Political Dummy -0.008**  -0.007  
 
Political Ratio 
 
(0.004) 
 
 
 
-0.021 
(0.015) 
(0.005) 
 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.018) 
FFO 
 
Board Independence 
 
Board Size 
 
LEV 
0.0354** 
(0.0138) 
0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.117*** 
0.0347** 
(0.0138) 
-0.036*** 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.117*** 
0.0401 
(0.0255) 
0.042*** 
(0.015) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.106*** 
0.0396 
(0.0255) 
-0.041*** 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.106*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016) 
PPE 0.015 0.016 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019) 
SIZE 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGE -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.060** 0.058** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.023) (0.024) 
Industry FE NO NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES YES 
Observations 1,580 1,580 1,580 1,580 
R-squared 0.170 0.169 0.198 0.197 
 
Note: 1. all variables are defined as before.  
2. ***, ** indicate the significance at the 1%, 5% levels respectively.  
     3. standard error in parenthesis. 
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